'The Fortitude' is we45's maiden Information Security Newsletter. Our aim is to bring the latest news, views and information from the world of Information Security. This month's articles focus on the following:
Website Security - Organizational Identity Attacks: This attack will focus on some of the newer threats that are affecting an organization's online identity, its website. This has been authored by Rahul Raghavan and the we45 Consulting Group and provides real life examples into the world of website security.
Information Technology Act 2000 - An Evolution: Is the IT Act 2000 enough for a dynamic and ever changing Information Security landscape? Sumana Naganand, Partner-Justlaw, explores some of the evolutionary trends of the Information Technology Act 2000 with reference to 'Phishing'
Access Control Flaws - Chinks in the Web Application Armour: we45's CTO, Abhay Bhargav delves into some of the serious flaws in access control logic that can cause your company to lose reputation and revenue.
Download it here!
Hope you enjoy it.
This blog aims at "Passing the Fear". It hopes to provide a very real and very scary perspective of InfoSec and also provide some pragmatic solutions to overcome your worst security fears. I would love for readers to contribute and pen their thoughts on Information Security after all, as Woodrow Wilson puts it "I not only use all the brains that I have, but all that I can borrow."
Saturday, March 27, 2010
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Targeted Phishing - for the Big Fish
Another article on the topic on the similar topic prompted me to chronicle my own experiences with "Targeted Phishing". Targeted Phishing is a variant of phishing that is specifically directed at an organization and its employees. So, someone pretending to be a part of (or somehow connected to your org) would send you an email with some news of an "Important Update" requiring you to login to an application to perform the update. The rest, as they say is history. While some would scoff at this notion, that employees of an organization would fall for this sort of thing, I would like to tell you that my experience with some organizations (some of whom are our clients) is otherwise. Let us explore the why and how and more importantly some of the sticky situations that can transpire as a result of Targeted phishing:
The Situation: More organizations are taking to SaaS apps and apps in the proverbial Cloud. While this is great for cost savings and ROI, it is also great for an individual intent on harvesting your organization's most sensitive information, leveraging on the lack of awareness your people have about phishing in general.
Imagine someone inside your organization setting up a dummy application copying HTML code from Google Apps, Salesforce.com, or several others with a login page, interfacing to a database that he/she controls. Worse, imagine someone on the outside setting up a similar application and sending emails to your employees requesting them to login to this application with their usernames and passwords. An even worse situation would be if this was setup targeting an internal application that your organization has hosted that may be carries customer data or other sensitive information.
What is the aftermath? Mostly, nothing. It is quite likely that this sort of an attack would never be detected (even if you have a security team, sometimes - personal experience with one of our clients). This attack would never be published on the Internet as an attack (because it is targeted at YOUR organization). There will be no advisories or newspaper articles (a la the Income Tax phishing email) This attack, most likely will never be discovered unless someone really at every form he/she is submitting and a lot of other details like the SSL, etc. Most people want to believe things and they would forget about this "Update" as soon as they "sign in" to the dummy app. So, CRM application may be harvested by an attacker for months.
What is the Solution?
I am sure all of your first reactions would be "No more SaaS and no more Cloud", but I urge you to abandon this abstinent approach and focus on some of the constructive solutions.
Education: My first one would be to educate users on such attacks. Some of our clients engage us to conduct Targeted Phishing attacks against their organizations and prove this point beyond doubt (because most of them fall for it), forcing their employees to take the Security Awareness training reaally seriously. In my opinion, the Awareness trainings that happen today lack in solid material and live examples and case studies. Ensure that your awareness trainings have solid material or get an outside agency to perform awareness training to drive this point home to your employees.
Monitoring: Monitoring is rarely taken seriously. People are the only defense (or vulnerability) in case of Social Engineering attacks like Phishing. Regular monitoring in the form of security surveys and questionnaires would provide the organization with some info on user security awareness and responses. Supplementing this with email pattern-matching emails flowing into the organization might also be a good way to keep this sort of attack at bay.
The Situation: More organizations are taking to SaaS apps and apps in the proverbial Cloud. While this is great for cost savings and ROI, it is also great for an individual intent on harvesting your organization's most sensitive information, leveraging on the lack of awareness your people have about phishing in general.
Imagine someone inside your organization setting up a dummy application copying HTML code from Google Apps, Salesforce.com, or several others with a login page, interfacing to a database that he/she controls. Worse, imagine someone on the outside setting up a similar application and sending emails to your employees requesting them to login to this application with their usernames and passwords. An even worse situation would be if this was setup targeting an internal application that your organization has hosted that may be carries customer data or other sensitive information.
What is the aftermath? Mostly, nothing. It is quite likely that this sort of an attack would never be detected (even if you have a security team, sometimes - personal experience with one of our clients). This attack would never be published on the Internet as an attack (because it is targeted at YOUR organization). There will be no advisories or newspaper articles (a la the Income Tax phishing email) This attack, most likely will never be discovered unless someone really at every form he/she is submitting and a lot of other details like the SSL, etc. Most people want to believe things and they would forget about this "Update" as soon as they "sign in" to the dummy app. So, CRM application may be harvested by an attacker for months.
What is the Solution?
I am sure all of your first reactions would be "No more SaaS and no more Cloud", but I urge you to abandon this abstinent approach and focus on some of the constructive solutions.
Education: My first one would be to educate users on such attacks. Some of our clients engage us to conduct Targeted Phishing attacks against their organizations and prove this point beyond doubt (because most of them fall for it), forcing their employees to take the Security Awareness training reaally seriously. In my opinion, the Awareness trainings that happen today lack in solid material and live examples and case studies. Ensure that your awareness trainings have solid material or get an outside agency to perform awareness training to drive this point home to your employees.
Monitoring: Monitoring is rarely taken seriously. People are the only defense (or vulnerability) in case of Social Engineering attacks like Phishing. Regular monitoring in the form of security surveys and questionnaires would provide the organization with some info on user security awareness and responses. Supplementing this with email pattern-matching emails flowing into the organization might also be a good way to keep this sort of attack at bay.
Saturday, February 13, 2010
My talk at the Business Technology Summit
I spoke on AppSec at the BT Summit on "Web Application Security for the Payment Card Industry". The talk was very well received and received great responses from a very "in-tune" audience. The slide-deck was supposed to be made available on the BT site, but requires some kind of authentication to access. Therefore, by popular demand, I have included the slide-deck on this blog. Hope it is useful!
Sunday, November 15, 2009
Why you might be 'Californicated' by SB-1386
SB 1386 is something most of us havent heard of. In the PCI and (fading) ISO juggernaut, organizations (especially outsourcing companies) have not taken cognizance of an important legal statute that might be a game changer for the way they do business with their principals in the US. Let me throw some light on what SB 1386 is all about. This is based on a conversation I had with another person from the outsourcing industry. The conversation might make a lot of sense to many people reading this....
What is the SB 1386?
SB 1386 is popularly known as The California Breach Security Information Act. It was an act enacted in the year 2002 and came to effect in 2003. The act focuses on the privacy of the personal information of the citizens of the state of California. The act states that any organization that believes that there has been a breach of un-encrypted personal information of California state residents is required to disclose the breach publicly.
What is 'Personal Information'? It is very vague...
No, its not vague. The act defines 'Personal Information' as the individual's first name or initial and last name in combination with one of the following: social security numbers, California State Identification Numbers, Credit/Debit Card numbers, PINS or access codes.
Ok. I am listening. Who does it apply to?
It applies to anyone doing business with anyone who is a California resident. If you have employees or customers in California, even a single one, it applies to you. If you are an outsourcing company that has a customer who has employees or customers who are California residents, then it applies to you. If you store data for entities that have information of California residents, then it applies. Large and small does not make a difference. It applies all the same.
That's alright. Its just a disclosure clause. No big deal....
That is where you are very wrong. You will have to disclose the breach to all those affected by it. These leads to a public relations war which you might have to wage with a great deal of reputational and financial expense. Your reputation WILL go to the cleaners because of a breach. You WILL face lawsuits from angry consumers and IF you are an outsourcing company, your customers will probably walk away from you and your prospects will NOT return your calls. Catch my point?
Yes, I think so. Wow, that seems worrying. I am an outsourcing partner for a lot of clients in the US. Can you tell me how it affects me?
Well, for starters if you are call center or a similar entity making outbound calls to US customers, you probably have the information which is defined by the act as "personal data", then you are in scope. If you are a back-end data processing center handling accounting or payroll or any other data processing activity for your client, then you are in scope. You will need to start securing all that data and doing it seriously. A lot of companies have breached your customer's data and you dont want that to happen. See here and here
I think I need some water now. My throat has gone dry. Anyway, what do I do now? How do I prevent a disaster from occurring?
For starters, call in a professional to audit your information security practices and let it be a thorough technical review and not a documentation and policy audit. Conduct a risk assessment for the data you handle and store and then formulate protection strategies in conjunction with your client. Have the auditor issue a formal audit report on completion and please, for heaven's sake, follow all the advice which you have been given. Dont try and cut corners on security practices, you will be in for a rude shock. Also be especially vigilant about employees who are working in your processes. It is very important to conduct periodic assessments and actively investigate any traces of malpractice from employees. Remember that insiders are the greatest cause of data theft in your industry.
Right then, but didnt you say something about encrypted data. So, if I encrypt data will I not have to disclose?
Well, yes, but have you encrypted data? and are you confident that your data has been consistently encrypted and the encryption keys managed properly for all your encrypted data?
I dont think I have encrypted any data. I am not really sure. I have got to check......
Then you most probably wouldn't have. Anyway, you better get going and do something about SB1386 otherwise you might be in for a world of pain. Think on the lines of being shot in the face with an AK-47.
(Gulps) Yes, not a pleasant situation. Anyway, I got to go. See you then...
Bye...
What is the SB 1386?
SB 1386 is popularly known as The California Breach Security Information Act. It was an act enacted in the year 2002 and came to effect in 2003. The act focuses on the privacy of the personal information of the citizens of the state of California. The act states that any organization that believes that there has been a breach of un-encrypted personal information of California state residents is required to disclose the breach publicly.
What is 'Personal Information'? It is very vague...
No, its not vague. The act defines 'Personal Information' as the individual's first name or initial and last name in combination with one of the following: social security numbers, California State Identification Numbers, Credit/Debit Card numbers, PINS or access codes.
Ok. I am listening. Who does it apply to?
It applies to anyone doing business with anyone who is a California resident. If you have employees or customers in California, even a single one, it applies to you. If you are an outsourcing company that has a customer who has employees or customers who are California residents, then it applies to you. If you store data for entities that have information of California residents, then it applies. Large and small does not make a difference. It applies all the same.
That's alright. Its just a disclosure clause. No big deal....
That is where you are very wrong. You will have to disclose the breach to all those affected by it. These leads to a public relations war which you might have to wage with a great deal of reputational and financial expense. Your reputation WILL go to the cleaners because of a breach. You WILL face lawsuits from angry consumers and IF you are an outsourcing company, your customers will probably walk away from you and your prospects will NOT return your calls. Catch my point?
Yes, I think so. Wow, that seems worrying. I am an outsourcing partner for a lot of clients in the US. Can you tell me how it affects me?
Well, for starters if you are call center or a similar entity making outbound calls to US customers, you probably have the information which is defined by the act as "personal data", then you are in scope. If you are a back-end data processing center handling accounting or payroll or any other data processing activity for your client, then you are in scope. You will need to start securing all that data and doing it seriously. A lot of companies have breached your customer's data and you dont want that to happen. See here and here
I think I need some water now. My throat has gone dry. Anyway, what do I do now? How do I prevent a disaster from occurring?
For starters, call in a professional to audit your information security practices and let it be a thorough technical review and not a documentation and policy audit. Conduct a risk assessment for the data you handle and store and then formulate protection strategies in conjunction with your client. Have the auditor issue a formal audit report on completion and please, for heaven's sake, follow all the advice which you have been given. Dont try and cut corners on security practices, you will be in for a rude shock. Also be especially vigilant about employees who are working in your processes. It is very important to conduct periodic assessments and actively investigate any traces of malpractice from employees. Remember that insiders are the greatest cause of data theft in your industry.
Right then, but didnt you say something about encrypted data. So, if I encrypt data will I not have to disclose?
Well, yes, but have you encrypted data? and are you confident that your data has been consistently encrypted and the encryption keys managed properly for all your encrypted data?
I dont think I have encrypted any data. I am not really sure. I have got to check......
Then you most probably wouldn't have. Anyway, you better get going and do something about SB1386 otherwise you might be in for a world of pain. Think on the lines of being shot in the face with an AK-47.
(Gulps) Yes, not a pleasant situation. Anyway, I got to go. See you then...
Bye...
Thursday, November 5, 2009
A Possibly Fresh perspective about Secure Code for Software Development Companies
I am sure most of you wont believe the reasons for my hiatus for almost 4 months. Let me try and explain. I was involved in a theater production very dear to my heart, so my evenings would be lost in that. I am pursuing a heavy writing assignment, which has been uber-demanding on the small space of time I have left and I actually took my vacation in September, when I had been to beautiful South Africa. Great place! You guys must all visit.
Anyway, enough with the chatter. This piece was prompted by a talk I heard at the Business Technology Summita few days ago. Of course, I blabbed about web app sec and scared the pants off a few nervous developers and architects, but it was mostly fun. The conference mostly focused on SOA ang governance, but there were a few pure tech talks. There was one talk, which I was quite impressed with, by a fellow Java man, Eben Hewitt. He spoke on a topic entitled "10 Things Software Architects must know", which is based on a book similarly entitled, except that the '10' has been replaced with '97'. The talk was mostly about concepts which software architects should keep in mind in order to be successful. While the talk didnt really have a specific security-related context, I applied some of those theories to the way software development companies can deal with security for the apps they develop. These are just my two cents. I am sure some of you can add more to it.
I have heard of several instances where software development companies have been severely criticized for writing non-secure code. Undoubtedly so. Several software development companies dont really take secure coding to be an important practice. Time is not spent developing security in the application from the beginning, which subsequently results in a non-secure web app. The most common excuse that most of these entities give in terms of security or any other functionality not implemented is "This type of security functionality was not laid out in our Requirements Specification" or "There was nothing in RFC specifying these security requirements" and blame is thrown right back at the customers or the business users of the application for their lack of foresight. It is as if we believe that customers who will be using the application or who are functional stakeholders of a web application are actually extremely clear about their requirements. The truth is very simple. They are as clueless as you are. In most cases, they will never really know what they want even functionally, unless they are given several ideas, security is quite a mile away in these circumstances. I believe that it is upto the company or the team developing the application to incorporate a risk assessment process to ensure that they capture all the critical information assets that will be stored, processed and transmitted by the application, threats and the impact of an attack on the application and subsequently on business, and then draw out security controls for the same. I have highlighted a detailed methodology for risk assessment for web apps, in my book "Secure Java for Web Application Development".It is wrong to assume that customers or business stakeholders will be able to provide the razor sharp clarity necessary to build security into an application. Software Development companies need to rise to the occasion and use their expertise to suggest solutions and functionality for security at the beginning of the application development lifecycle.
Which brings me to my second point. People reading my first point are going, "Yeah, but isnt that going to be more expensive than a regular application development effort, without going Mother Teresa on my customer?" Yes it will be a longer, probably marginally more expensive process, but Quality is a Feature. We all try and sort out all problems all the time. Let us not try to do that and examine reality. Software development companies focussed on a greater level of quality of their products must make it explicit. You have various product and service offerings today, but it is important to realize that all services and products will not be of the same quality. A restaurant on the roadside, will not be as focused on quality than a snazzy five star restaurant. Its high time that we understood that about code as well. And its also high time that software development companies that are taking the first point seriously, start making it explicit and derive as much benefit as possible. There may be customers out there (despite the recession) that may be willing to pay better for a better service that is accentuated and re-iterated by processes like Risk assessment, effective understanding security functionality at the start of the lifecycle, vulnerability assessments, security code reviews and practices delving into security. Superior quality, in my opinion is a feature by itself, which needs to be advertised, and made explicit and should not be spoken about or practiced like its a part of the proverbial 'package'.
Let me know what you think of this....
Anyway, enough with the chatter. This piece was prompted by a talk I heard at the Business Technology Summita few days ago. Of course, I blabbed about web app sec and scared the pants off a few nervous developers and architects, but it was mostly fun. The conference mostly focused on SOA ang governance, but there were a few pure tech talks. There was one talk, which I was quite impressed with, by a fellow Java man, Eben Hewitt. He spoke on a topic entitled "10 Things Software Architects must know", which is based on a book similarly entitled, except that the '10' has been replaced with '97'. The talk was mostly about concepts which software architects should keep in mind in order to be successful. While the talk didnt really have a specific security-related context, I applied some of those theories to the way software development companies can deal with security for the apps they develop. These are just my two cents. I am sure some of you can add more to it.
I have heard of several instances where software development companies have been severely criticized for writing non-secure code. Undoubtedly so. Several software development companies dont really take secure coding to be an important practice. Time is not spent developing security in the application from the beginning, which subsequently results in a non-secure web app. The most common excuse that most of these entities give in terms of security or any other functionality not implemented is "This type of security functionality was not laid out in our Requirements Specification" or "There was nothing in RFC specifying these security requirements" and blame is thrown right back at the customers or the business users of the application for their lack of foresight. It is as if we believe that customers who will be using the application or who are functional stakeholders of a web application are actually extremely clear about their requirements. The truth is very simple. They are as clueless as you are. In most cases, they will never really know what they want even functionally, unless they are given several ideas, security is quite a mile away in these circumstances. I believe that it is upto the company or the team developing the application to incorporate a risk assessment process to ensure that they capture all the critical information assets that will be stored, processed and transmitted by the application, threats and the impact of an attack on the application and subsequently on business, and then draw out security controls for the same. I have highlighted a detailed methodology for risk assessment for web apps, in my book "Secure Java for Web Application Development".It is wrong to assume that customers or business stakeholders will be able to provide the razor sharp clarity necessary to build security into an application. Software Development companies need to rise to the occasion and use their expertise to suggest solutions and functionality for security at the beginning of the application development lifecycle.
Which brings me to my second point. People reading my first point are going, "Yeah, but isnt that going to be more expensive than a regular application development effort, without going Mother Teresa on my customer?" Yes it will be a longer, probably marginally more expensive process, but Quality is a Feature. We all try and sort out all problems all the time. Let us not try to do that and examine reality. Software development companies focussed on a greater level of quality of their products must make it explicit. You have various product and service offerings today, but it is important to realize that all services and products will not be of the same quality. A restaurant on the roadside, will not be as focused on quality than a snazzy five star restaurant. Its high time that we understood that about code as well. And its also high time that software development companies that are taking the first point seriously, start making it explicit and derive as much benefit as possible. There may be customers out there (despite the recession) that may be willing to pay better for a better service that is accentuated and re-iterated by processes like Risk assessment, effective understanding security functionality at the start of the lifecycle, vulnerability assessments, security code reviews and practices delving into security. Superior quality, in my opinion is a feature by itself, which needs to be advertised, and made explicit and should not be spoken about or practiced like its a part of the proverbial 'package'.
Let me know what you think of this....
Saturday, July 18, 2009
PA-DSS 101
That blank feeling in my stomach, which was there for the past 2 weeks or so is slowly disappearing as I sit down to write this piece. My blog hasn't been impregnated in the past 2 weeks with my words and (sometimes meaningless) rants. I was unwell during the week and till yesterday I was at a Risk Assessment workshop on the OCTAVE methodology, where I spoke on Vulnerability Assessment and generally had some engagements which didnt allow me the time to sit down and pen something in the interest of security.
This piece is a result of an article I read in blogosphere somewhere today. It was something about Visa giving a great thrust to Software security through the PA-DSS program. Visa has indicated that Visa acquirers in all regions of the world must ensure that the merchants they newly sign must use PA-DSS Compliant Applications in their environments by the July 2010 and existing merchants should be transitioned to PA-DSS compliant Applications by the July 2012. I would see that as a welcome step in software/application security, and something that will be helpful to a huge extent in the application security quest. This is why:
What is the PA-DSS?
The PA-DSS is not as famous as its mother standard, which we all lovingly know as the PCI-DSS also known simply, as PCI. The PA-DSS is the Payment Application Data Security Standard. It is meant for commercial applications which come in contact with cardholder information either during the authorization or settlement function of the card payment transaction. PA-DSS is entirely meant for an application and consists of 14 requirements encompassing all aspects of security which a payment application will have to adhere to. This includes secure storage of cardholder information, logging, authentication&authorization, secure development and deployment, etc. The PA-DSS is a sub-set of the PCI-DSS, with the core focus on the application as opposed to the cardholder data environment in PCI-DSS. This is better explained with an example. For instance, a application developer "A" has developed an E-Commerce application which is to be sold to several merchants. Merchants all over the world are either thinking about, undergoing or have undergone PCI Compliance. If 'A' has to support his prospective customer's PCI Compliance effort, then it imperative that the application be validated as per the PA-DSS requirements. The PA-DSS is a certification for the application and not for the environment. So, if 'A' gets his application validated PA-DSS, then the application is readily designed to support the PCI requirements and merchant's PCI compliance effort wouldn't be hindered. The PA-DSS has been designed to ensure that the payment applications deployed in PCI environment must support PCI compliance, which is why the PA-DSS has come to be.
Why PA-DSS?
One of the greatest impediments for security are the applications. I have seen several environments, where the entire process of security compliance or practices comes to grinding halt because of applications being unsupportive of security requirements. Applications are the lifeblood of any entity in business today. An e-commerce merchant cannot do business without the e-commerce application and its related components. A payment processor will find it impossible to process millions of transactions a day without the financial switch and its related applications. Customers are wedded to the applications they purchase and any change is resented and sometimes not recommended as a 24x7 scenario is the need of the hour. Most of these applications fall short of basic and advanced security needs by a long shot. Several financial switch applications log the entire magnetic stripe information, including the Card number, CVV and other track elements in CLEAR TEXT, a strict no-no from the PCI standpoint as well as from a general security standpoint. Several E-commerce applications purchased and deployed by customers don't support hashing of passwords, encryption of cardholder information and not to mention web application security practices like input validation. Point of Sale applications used by merchants log the entire card number in the transaction logs and several of them dont support anything more than a 4 char password. This is a huge impediment in adhering to security requirements. Merchants and processors often struggle with security implementation because of the applications and even after the best workarounds, the risk of data being stolen, modified or destroyed still remains amply. The aim of the PA-DSS is to correct this situation by ensuring that application vendors creating commercial payment applications to be sold, must get their applications validated against the PA-DSS requirements.
Why not just PCI? Doesn't it cover Application Security?
Yes, PCI does cover application security in its requirements. In fact Requirement 6 is dedicated largely to application security practices and web application security practices, including a great deal of wisdom from the OWASP knowledge base, providing a much-needed boost to AppSec, but PCI addresses the applications which are custom developed or developed in-house. The focus of the PA-DSS is for payment applications which are to be sold, distributed or licensed to third parties. So the loop is pretty simple
Well, you do not. The PA-DSS is only applicable for applications which are part of the payment authorization and settlement cycle. So if you are a log management application, WAF, or any other application which is looking for a marketing boost from the PCI fever, you will not able to go the PA-DSS route as it is specifically for Payment Applications.
This piece is a result of an article I read in blogosphere somewhere today. It was something about Visa giving a great thrust to Software security through the PA-DSS program. Visa has indicated that Visa acquirers in all regions of the world must ensure that the merchants they newly sign must use PA-DSS Compliant Applications in their environments by the July 2010 and existing merchants should be transitioned to PA-DSS compliant Applications by the July 2012. I would see that as a welcome step in software/application security, and something that will be helpful to a huge extent in the application security quest. This is why:
What is the PA-DSS?
The PA-DSS is not as famous as its mother standard, which we all lovingly know as the PCI-DSS also known simply, as PCI. The PA-DSS is the Payment Application Data Security Standard. It is meant for commercial applications which come in contact with cardholder information either during the authorization or settlement function of the card payment transaction. PA-DSS is entirely meant for an application and consists of 14 requirements encompassing all aspects of security which a payment application will have to adhere to. This includes secure storage of cardholder information, logging, authentication&authorization, secure development and deployment, etc. The PA-DSS is a sub-set of the PCI-DSS, with the core focus on the application as opposed to the cardholder data environment in PCI-DSS. This is better explained with an example. For instance, a application developer "A" has developed an E-Commerce application which is to be sold to several merchants. Merchants all over the world are either thinking about, undergoing or have undergone PCI Compliance. If 'A' has to support his prospective customer's PCI Compliance effort, then it imperative that the application be validated as per the PA-DSS requirements. The PA-DSS is a certification for the application and not for the environment. So, if 'A' gets his application validated PA-DSS, then the application is readily designed to support the PCI requirements and merchant's PCI compliance effort wouldn't be hindered. The PA-DSS has been designed to ensure that the payment applications deployed in PCI environment must support PCI compliance, which is why the PA-DSS has come to be.
Why PA-DSS?
One of the greatest impediments for security are the applications. I have seen several environments, where the entire process of security compliance or practices comes to grinding halt because of applications being unsupportive of security requirements. Applications are the lifeblood of any entity in business today. An e-commerce merchant cannot do business without the e-commerce application and its related components. A payment processor will find it impossible to process millions of transactions a day without the financial switch and its related applications. Customers are wedded to the applications they purchase and any change is resented and sometimes not recommended as a 24x7 scenario is the need of the hour. Most of these applications fall short of basic and advanced security needs by a long shot. Several financial switch applications log the entire magnetic stripe information, including the Card number, CVV and other track elements in CLEAR TEXT, a strict no-no from the PCI standpoint as well as from a general security standpoint. Several E-commerce applications purchased and deployed by customers don't support hashing of passwords, encryption of cardholder information and not to mention web application security practices like input validation. Point of Sale applications used by merchants log the entire card number in the transaction logs and several of them dont support anything more than a 4 char password. This is a huge impediment in adhering to security requirements. Merchants and processors often struggle with security implementation because of the applications and even after the best workarounds, the risk of data being stolen, modified or destroyed still remains amply. The aim of the PA-DSS is to correct this situation by ensuring that application vendors creating commercial payment applications to be sold, must get their applications validated against the PA-DSS requirements.
Why not just PCI? Doesn't it cover Application Security?
Yes, PCI does cover application security in its requirements. In fact Requirement 6 is dedicated largely to application security practices and web application security practices, including a great deal of wisdom from the OWASP knowledge base, providing a much-needed boost to AppSec, but PCI addresses the applications which are custom developed or developed in-house. The focus of the PA-DSS is for payment applications which are to be sold, distributed or licensed to third parties. So the loop is pretty simple
if (inHouseApplication() || customCode()) {
validateAsPerPCIDSS();
} else {
validateAsPerPADSS();
}
Thats great, I have developed a log management app for PCI, when can I get it PA-DSS validated?Well, you do not. The PA-DSS is only applicable for applications which are part of the payment authorization and settlement cycle. So if you are a log management application, WAF, or any other application which is looking for a marketing boost from the PCI fever, you will not able to go the PA-DSS route as it is specifically for Payment Applications.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Why attackers love your developers!
Kind Sir
My name is Developer A. I am having a problem with database connectivity to Oracle. I think I am doing everything right, but I am getting an HTTP 500 error with the following details:
(Full Stack trace follows)
The sample of the source code is given here.
(Source Code follows)
The error where it is occurring is at this URL (Organization's url follows)
Please help me out with this as soon as possible. I reeeallly need help!!!
Email me at developerA@organization.com
Yes. This was one of the messages I found sifting through my Google hacking results while I was pen-testing a web application the other day. Needless to say that, the page with the stack trace was open for me to go and gain a complete understanding of the application and penetrate. The organization which I was pentesting had gone great distances to get secure. They had spent a lot of time, money and resources in getting secure and staying that way. They had gotten a few things wrong, but mostly they were on target. Unfortunately, they had forgotten to explain to their developers that dirty laundry (or in this case confidential laundry) should not be washed in public. I have seen this with several organizations (mostly in Software development) where developers post their queries in Internet forums and get some other professionals to look at it and give them some insight into the matter. While there is nothing wrong with this practice, the way it is followed is quite shocking. Developers dont even go through the trouble of hiding the name of the organization they are working for. They advertise their email address and in several cases the URL of the page which is problematic and buggy. When posting code snippets or source code, they mostly never remove sensitive details like certain class references or database drivers (sometimes, even usernames and passwords to dbs) and last but not the least, they use words like "Kind Sir" on an Internet forum (although the last one is not a vulnerability, it is bloody irritating). I am sure all of you would realize that such information can be extremely useful to anyone looking to break into an application or a site. It would be worth its weight in gold. And, of course, as usual the only thing you really have to do is "Google it" or "Bing it" (my vendor agnostic comment for the day).My advice to organizations to prevent against such ignominious disclosures are these:
- Instruct developers never to post in internet forums under their own name or with their company credentials like emails, etc.
- Encourage developers to first find help within the organization. I have seen that several greenhorns tend to be afraid of asking their seniors or project managers any doubts regarding the code, fearing a nasty remark or backlash. Build an environment of openness and encourage questions. Not doing so, would result in these juniors asking questions anyway, but to someone you are totally not aware of, not bound by confidentiality agreements, etc.
- If someone really has to post queries on the Internet, make sure that these are approved. Source code should not be posted. Stack trace should not be posted. Questions should be based on peripheral details and no sensitive information should be posted. Words like "Kind sir" should definitely be filtered out of posts ;)
- Have your risk folks scour the internet regularly checking for violations and take action against people violating these instructions.
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The views presented in this blog are entirely mine and are not those of my company.
© Abhay Bhargav 2010
© Abhay Bhargav 2010